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Abstract: The motivation crowding effect suggests that an external intervention via 
monetary incentives or punishments may undermine (and under different indentifiable 
conditions strengthen) intrinsic motivation. As of today, the theoretical possibility of 
crowding effects is widely accepted among economists. Many of them, however, have 
been critical about its empirical relevance. This survey shows that such scepticism is 
unwarranted and that there exists indeed compelling empirical evidence for the 
existence of crowding out and crowding in. It is based on circumstantial insight, 
laboratory studies by both psychologists and economists as well as field research by 
econometric studies. The presented pieces of evidence refer to a wide variety of areas 
of the economy and society and have been collected for many different countries and 
periods. Crowding effects thus are an empirically relevant phenomenon, which can, in 
specific cases, even dominate the traditional relative price effect.  
 
 
Keywords:  Crowding effect, intrinsic motivation, principal-agent theory, economic psychology, 
experiments  
JEL-Codes: A12, J33, L22 
 
                                                 
1 Prof. Bruno S. Frey, Institute for Empirical Economic Research, Blümlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zürich, 
Switzerland, Tel. +41-1-634-37-30/31, eMail: bsfrey@iew.unizh.ch 
 
1. Background  
The basic idea that rewards, and in particular monetary rewards, may crowd out intrinsic 
motivation emanates from two quite different branches of literature in the social sciences. Thirty 
years ago  in his book The Gift Relationship Titmuss (1970) argued that paying for blood 
undermines cherished social values and would therefore reduce or totally destroy people′s 
willingness to donate blood. Though he was unable to come up with any serious empirical 
evidence his thesis attracted much attention.  
A second literature stems from psychology. A group of cognitive social psychologists2 have 
identified that under particular conditions monetary (external) rewards undermine intrinsic 
motivation. The application of rewards for undertaking an activity thus has indirect negative 
consequences, provided intrinsic motivation is considered to be beneficial3. For that reason this 
effect has been termed „The Hidden Cost of Reward“ (see Lepper and Greene, 1978 for an 
account and extensive references), „Overjustification Hypothesis“ (Lepper, Greene and Nisbett, 
1973) or „Corruption Effect“ (Deci 1975). More recently, the idea has been known as „Cognitive 
Evaluation Theory“(Deci, Koestner and Ryan, 1999). In contrast to Timuss′ mere hunch, a great 
many laboratory experiments support this motivational effect: “the evidence for a detrimental 
effect comes from a wide variety of works in which a large number of subjects and 
methodological parameters have been varied” (McGraw, 1978, pp. 55-58).  
 
The two strands of literature are quite independent from each other judging from the missing 
cross references. In particular, Titmuss′ idea was not connected to the psychological theories on 
the undermining effect of monetary rewards. As a consequence, two leading economists, and 
later Nobel-prize winners, Solow (1971) and Arrow (1972), who reviewed the book were at a loss 
and could not detect any reason why increasing monetary incentives, or the price of paying for 
blood, should not increase the quantity supplied. 
Over the last few years a dramatic change has taken place. Many social scientists, including 
economists, now admit the theoretical possibility that part of the motivation may be negatively 
                                                 
2 Headed by Deci (1971, 1972, 1975, 1987). The work is summarized and extended in Deci and Ryan (1980, 1985). 
Extensive surveys are given e.g. in Pittmann and Heller (1987), and Lane (1991, esp. ch. 19). 
3 This is the normal assumption when one thinks of activities such as work (work ethics), tax paying (tax morale), 
preserving nature (environmental morale) or charitable giving (altruism). But intrinsic motivation may also be 
undesirable as for instance in the case of greed, envy or vengeance. Indeed, it may be argued that some ot the most 
hideous crimes in history were at least partly intrinsically motivated, Hitler and Stalin being examples. In contrast it 
affected when a previously non-monetary relationship is transformed into a monetary one, and 
they now accept it as part of a wider concept of human incentives. However, many of them, if not 
most of them, take this „crowding-out effect“  (as it will subsequently be called) to be of little 
empirical relevance.  
The purpose of this survey is to demonstrate that the crowding-out effect and its correlate, the 
crowding-in effect, are empirically well founded and have been observed in many different areas 
of the economy and society. Arguably, it is one of the most important anomalies in economics as 
it may reverse the most fundamental economic „law“, namely that raising monetary incentives 
increases supply. The crowding-out effect suggests that there are relevant circumstances in which 
it is advisable not to use the price mechanism to elicit a higher supply but to rely on a quite 
different type of incentive, intrinsic motivation.  
Section II offers a short discussion of crowding theory as it has been integrated into economics. 
Section III provides the empirical evidence according to everyday experience, controlled 
laboratory evidence both by psychologists and economists, and field evidence by econometric 
studies. Section IV draws conclusions. 
 
2. Crowding Theory in Economics       
Monetary incentives crowding out the motivation to undertake an activity may be considered a 
major anomaly because it predicts the exactly reverse reaction that the relative price effect on 
which much of economics is grounded4. The successes of the “economic approach to human 
behaviour” (Becker, 1976; Frey, 1999a) or of “economic imperialism” (Stigler, 1984; Hirshleifer, 
1985) is due to the skillful application of the relative price effect. 
Crowding theory stipulates a systematic interaction between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation.  
Economic theory considers the first type of motivation, only. Major schools in psychology, on the 
other hand, emphasize the motives coming from within the person. Following Deci (1971,  
p. 105), “one is said to be intrinsically motivated to perform an activity when one receives no 
apparent reward except the activity itself”. Intrinsic motivation is a firmly established concept in 
psychology (and partly in other social sciences such as sociology); its modern formulation  goes 
back to De Charmes (1968) and Deci (1975).  
                                                                                                                                                              
has been shown that extrinsically motivated soldiers are less prone to commit crimes and tend to treat prisoners of 
war more humanely (Frey 1999a, ch. 7). 
As crowding theory involves shifts in individual preferences, this concept basically differs from 
other phenomena that are sometimes referred to as crowding-out effects. In monetary economics, 
a rise in the rate of interest is taken to crowd  out private investment (see any standard 
macroeconomic textbook, e. g. Mankiw 1994, p. 62), and in public economics, government 
subsidies are taken to crowd out private donations and charitable contributions (see e. g. Venti 
and Wise, 1990; Poterba, Venti and Wise, 1998; Bolton and Katok, 1998). In both areas, 
individual preference functions are unaffected, indeed the effects observed are a particular 
manifestation of the relative price effect. 
For the purpose of economics, the „hidden cost of reward“ have been generalized in two respects 
(Frey 1997a): 
(1) All interventions emanating from outside the person considered, i.e. both positive rewards 
and regulations accompanied by negative sanctions, may affect intrinsic motivation; 
(2) External interventions may crowd-out or crowd-in intrinsic motivation (or leave it 
unaffected). 
The impact of extrinsic interventions upon behavior can best be shown in the context of a 
principal-agent relationship (see e.g. the recent surveys by Gibbons 1998 and Prendergast 1999). 
The principal uses rewards and commands in order to raise the performance P of the agent. The 
agent could be an employee or worker in a firm, but more general everyone who is given a task to 
perform. 
A (representative) agent performs by considering the benefits B and the cost C of his action. Both 
increase in performance, i.e. ∂B/∂P≡BP>0 and ∂C/∂P≡CP>0.  
Higher performance has diminishing marginal returns (BPP<0) and is associated with increasing 
marginal cost (CPP>0). Benefits and cost are also influenced by the principal's external 
intervention (E): 
 B = B(P,E); BP>0, BPP<0. (1) 
 C = C(P,E); CP>0, CPP>0. (2) 
A rational agent chooses the level of performance P* that maximizes net benefits (B-C), which 
yields the first order condition 
 BP = CP. (3) 
                                                                                                                                                              
4 Anomalies have received great attention in economics, see e.g the summary in Thaler 1992. However, none of the 
anomalies such as the endowment, sunk cost or recency effect reverses the relative price effect but rather mitigates it 
only. 
Differentiating this optimality condition with respect to E shows how the agent's optimal 









 0. (4) 
 
Three cases may be distinguished: 
(a) Following the standard economic principal-agent theory (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz 1972, 
Fama and Jensen 1983), external intervention raises performance by imposing higher marginal 
cost on shirking, or, equivalently, by lowering the marginal cost of performing, CPE <0. This is 
the relative price effect of external intervention. One could also speak of a disciplining effect 
which monetary reward or commands impose on an agent. Thus, the crowding out effect is 
neglected, i.e., a change in external intervention does not affect the marginal benefit of 
performing (BPE=0), as intrinsic motivation is, implicitly, taken to be a constant or absent. Thus, 
external intervention unequivocally raises performance: 
 dP*/dE>0. (4a) 
The same outcome holds if external intervention raises intrinsic motivation. In that case the 
marginal benefit from performing is raised (BPE>0) and the effect through disciplining the agent 
is further strengthened by the crowding-in effect. In this case the relative price effect works in the 
same direction as the crowding effect. External incentives raise agents' motivation to perform, 
and at the same time their intrinsic motivation to perform is raised. 
(b) In contrast, when external intervention undermines intrinsic motivation and thus negatively 
affects the agent's marginal benefit from performing (BPE<0, crowding-out effect), while the 
disciplining effect does not work (CPE = 0), stronger external intervention reduces the agent's 
performance level 
 dP*/dE < 0. (4b) 
(c) In general, both the relative price effect (CPE<0) and the crowding-out effect (BPE<0) are 
active, so that external intervention has two opposite effects on the agent's performance. Whether 
intervening is beneficial from the principal's point of view depends on the relative size of the two 
countervailing effects. A more detailed formal analysis of the possibly conflicting nature of 
external intervention can be found in Chang and Lai (1999). 
Figure 1 shows the interaction of the crowding-out effect and the price effect graphically. S is the 
traditional supply curve based on the relative price effect: raising the external reward for work 
effort form O to R increases work effort from A to A’. The crowding-out effect induces the 
supply curve to shift leftwards to S’. Thus, raising the reward from O to R leads to point C 
(instead of B). As the figure is drawn, the crowding-out effect dominates the relative price effect, 
and raising the reward from O to R reduces work effort from A to A’’. Once intrinsic motivation 
has been crowded out completely, the normal supply curve takes over again, and raising the 
reward unequivocally increases work effort (movement along S’).  
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 Figure 1: Net-outcome of the Price- and the Crowding-Effect 
 
The effects of external interventions on intrinsic motivation have been attributed to two 
psychological processes: 
(a) Impaired self-determination. When individuals perceive an external intervention to reduce 
their self-determination, they substitute intrinsic motivation by extrinsic control. Following 
Rotter (1966), the locus of control shifts from the inside to the outside of the person affected. 
Individuals who are forced to behave in a specific way by outside intervention, feel overjustified 
if they maintained their intrinsic motivation. 
(b) Impaired self-esteem. When an intervention from outside carries the notion that the actor's 
motivation is not acknowledged, his or her intrinsic motivation is effectively rejected. The person 
affected feels that his or her involvement and competence is not appreciated which debases its 
value. An intrinsically motivated person is taken away the chance to display his or her own 
interest and involvement in an activity when someone else offers a reward, or commands, to 
undertake it. As a result of impaired self-esteem, individuals reduce effort. 
The two processes identified allow us to derive the psychological conditions under which the 
crowding-out effect appears: 
(1) External interventions crowd-out intrinsic motivation if the individuals affected perceive 
them to be controlling. In that case, both self-determination and self-esteem suffer, and the 
individuals react by reducing their intrinsic motivation in the activity controlled. 
(2)  External interventions crowd-in intrinsic motivation if the individuals concerned perceive it 
as supportive. In that case, self-esteem is fostered, and individuals feel that they are given 
more freedom to act, thus enlarging self-determination. 
Crowding effects are potentially relevant in many different areas of individual behavior in the 
economy. Examples are the labour market where the effect of higher compensation on work 
effort and in particular performance pay are at issue; the natural environment where the effect of 
pricing instruments such as pollution charges on environmental ethics is in question; social policy 
where it must be considered whether monetary incentives crowd out the notion of responsibility 
for one′s own fate; subsidization policy where a possible negative effect on entrepreuneurship,  
innovation and creativity must be taken into account;  organization theory where the limits of the 
firm must be reconsidered in view of possible limits of relying purely on extrinsic incentives; and 
contract theory where relational or „psychological contracts“ (Rousseau 1995; Morrison and 
Robinson 1997) may require intrinsic motivation and hence crowding out should be avoided5. 
 
The generally prevailing scepticism about the empirical relevance of the crowding effects has for 
many scholars been a major reason for not persuing the analysis any further. This scepticism has 
been fuelled by the publication of a meta-analysis of a large number of experimental studies 
undertaken by social psychologists which concluded that the crowding out effect is „largely a 
myth“ (Cameron and Pierce, 1994; Eisenberger and Cameron, 1996). But even scholars who do 
not rely on experimental results are reluctant to accept the crowding-out anomaly. A statement 
representative for many such scholars is contained in the survey „The Provision of Incentives in 
the Firm“  by Prendergast (1999, p. 18):“ While this idea (crowding-out, the authors) holds some 
intuitive appeal, it should be noted that there is little conclusive empirical evidence (particularly 
in workplace settings) of these influences“.6 Gibbons (1998, p. 130), however, in his survey of 
„Incentives in Organizations“ concedes : „A more troubling possibility is that management 
practices based on economic models may dampen (or even destroy) non-economic realities such 
as intrinsic motivation and social relations. Field experiments on this issue would be especially 
useful“. 
Obviously unnoticed by many researchers (such as Gibbons, see the statement above), an 
increasing number of studies have indeed tried to find empirical laboratory as well as field 
evidence for the undermining effect of rewards on motivation. The following section intends to 
survey the present state of the empirical literature on the subject. 
 
3. Empirical Evidence    
3.1 Circumstantial Evidence 
Although the basic intuition tells us that we are rather willing to undertake a task if we can expect 
a reward, there is a number of specific situations where the undermining effect of external 
incentives is also easily understood. This is most of all the case when tasks are repeatedly 
performed. A good ad hoc example is children who are paid by their parents for mowing the 
family lawn. Once they expect to receive money for that task, they are only willing to do it again 
if they indeed receive a monetary compensation (see Antonides, 1996, p.26). The induced 
unwillingness to do anything for free may also expand to other household chores.7  
An old Jewish fable confirms this intuition (in Deci and Flaste, 1995, p. 26):  
                                                                                                                                                              
5 First attempts at analyzing such issues are undertaken in Frey 1997a, 1999b, Osterloh and Frey 1999.  
6 It should, however, not be surprising that there is no relevant crowding effect observable in a competitive 
environment as it is found with firms and in workplace settings, but see also Güth (1998). It can, however, be 
expected that successful firms find ways (by intuition or learning from negative experiences) to use external 
motivators in a supporting instead of a controlling manner. That does not mean, however, that the crowding effect is 
irrelevant as an element and factor in the failure of firms, projects or organizational structures.    
7 This may be the main reason why all of the parents consulted by the authors (in a non-representative, small-scale 
survey) by intuition pay their childrens‘ pocket money as a lump sum (while expecting some cooperation in 
household tasks) instead of assigning a specific sum to a given task. Such a strategy seems to be persisting in spite of 
the potential unfairness between ‚buzy‘ and ‚lazy‘ siblings. 
“It seem that bigots were eager to rid their town of a Jewish man who had opened a tailor 
shop on Main Street, so they sent a group of rowdies to harass the tailor. Each day, the 
ruffians would show up to jeer. The situation was grim, but the tailor was ingenious. One 
day when the hoodlums arrived, he gave each of them a dime for their efforts. Delighted, 
they shouted their insults and moved on. The next day they returned to shout, expecting 
their dime. But the tailor said he could only afford a nickel and proceeded to hand a 
nickel to each of them. Well, they were a bit disappointed, but a nickel after all is a nickel, 
so they took it, did their jeering, and left. The next day, they returned once again and the 
tailor said he had only a penny for them and held out his hand. Indignant, the young 
toughs sneered and proclaimed that they would certainly not spend their time jeering at 
him for a measly penny. So they didn’t. And all was well for the tailor.”  
 
Other circumstantial evidence shows that the reward must not be monetary in the first place. Deci 
and Flaste (1995) discuss the case of a perfectionist child in violin class. Once ‘gold-stars’ were 
introduced as a symbolic reward for a certain amount of time spent practicing the instrument, the 
girl lost all her interest in trying new, difficult pieces. Instead of improving her skills, the aim 
shifted towards spending time playing well-learned, easy pieces in order to receive the award. 
The crowding effect may also work the other way round. This crowding-in effect is shown in the 
example of a patient who had difficulties to regularly take her hypertension medication. Her 
doctor’s frequent admonishing or reminders of possible consequences had no effect. Despite 
ending up in the emergency room a couple of times, the patient only achieved to alter her 
behavior when a new doctor – instead of pressuring her to take the medication – asked her what 
time of the day she considered best to take the pills. Thereby he reinforced her intrinsic 
motivation to follow the prescription. 
 
 
3.2. Laboratory Evidence 
3.2.1  In Psychology 
There is such a large number of laboratory experiments on the crowding effect that it is 
impossible to summarize the results here. Fortunately, there have already been not less than five 
formal meta-analytical studies of the crowding theory. Rummel and Feinberg (1988) used 45 
experimental studies covering the period 1971-85, Wiersma (1992) 20 studies covering 1971-90, 
and Tang and Hall (1995) 50 studies from 1972-92. These meta-analyses essentially support the 
findings that intrinsic motivation is undermined if the externally applied rewards are perceived to 
be controlling by the recipients. This view was challenged by Cameron and Pierce (1994) and 
Eisenberger and Cameron (1996) who on the basis of their own meta-analysis of studies 
published in the period 1971-1991 (the two studies are based on a virtually identical set of 
studies) concluded that the undermining effect is largely "a myth". These studies attracted a great 
deal of attention, and many scholars on that basis seem to have concluded that no such thing as a 
crowding-out effect exists. 
Deci, Koestner and Ryan (1999) conducted an extensive study to show that these conclusions are 
unwarranted and that the crowding-out effect is a robust phenomenon of significant size under 
the specified conditions. The authors identified a number of significant shortcomings and 
misinterpretations. One is that Cameron and Pierce omitted nearly 20 percent of the relevant 
studies as outliers, used mistaken control groups and misclassified some of the studies. Another is 
that they included dull and boring tasks for which a crowding-out effect cannot occur as the 
participants had no intrinsic motivation to begin with. In order to correct these failures, Deci, 
Koestner and Ryan conducted an extensive meta-analysis including all the studies considered by 
Cameron, Pierce and Eisenberger as well as several studies which appeared since then. The 68 
experiments reported in 59 articles span the period 1971-1997, and refer to 97 experimental 
effects. It turns out that tangible rewards undermine intrinsic motivation for interesting tasks (i.e. 
tasks for which the experimental subjects show an intrinsic interest) in a highly significant and 
very reliable way, and that the effect is moderately large. This holds in particular for monetary 
compensations which are perceived to be controlling by the experimental subjects and therefore 
tend to crowd out intrinsic motivation. The crowding-out effect is stronger with monetary than 
with symbolic rewards. It is also larger with expected than with unexpected rewards. When the 
problems at issue are complicated, the negative relationship between reward and performance is 
stronger than when the problems are simple (see Deci and Ryan 1985; Heckhausen 1989, ch. 15). 
In all these cases, it is required that the behavior was initially perceived to be interesting and 
therefore intrinsically rewarding (Calder and Staw 1975).  
 
3.2.2. In Economics 
Concerning crowding effects on motivation, the field of experimental economic research lacks 
the long and rich tradition found in psychology. There is nonetheless an increasing number of 
studies done on the subject. The experiments by Fehr and Gächter (1997) as well as Fehr, 
Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997) propose the possibility of a crowding-out effect for intrinsic 
motivation in the form of a tendency for reciprocal behavior. Zanella (1998) carried out a 
laboratory experiment designed to test the hypothesis that incentive contracts crowd out 
reciprocity. She differentiates between a reciprocity-treatment and an incentive-treatment in a 
sequential game of labor contracts. Her findings confirm the crowding hypothesis. The 
participants playing in the reciprocity-treatment performed better (i. e. they forfeited more rents 
that could have been gained by not working) than in an incentive-treatment.8 
In a different type of experiments, Gneezy and Rustichini (1998) found the exact relationship 
between pay and performance as displayed in Figure 1 above. Whenever money was offered, the 
standard price-effect was observed, i. e. a larger amount of money produces higher performance. 
The mere incidence of payment, however, even lowered performance in many cases. In their 
experiments, of all participants performing the same task, only those groups which received a 
considerable amount of pay did as well as the groups that worked for free. Their evidence 
suggests that the type of contract and the (monetary vs. non-monetary) work environment evoke 
different responses from the agents. In a second set of experiments they find that principals 
systematically underestimate the undermining effect of (small) monetary incentives. 
Bohnet, Frey and Huck (1999) studied the crowding-effects in contract enforcement with respect 
to the trustworthiness of the participants. They used an evolutionary game model in which, due to 
the limits of the modeled legal system, a first mover relies to a certain degree (differing between 
various groups) on the trustworthiness of a second mover. The first mover can either offer a 
contract or not play at all while the second mover has the choice to perform or to breach the 
contract. The level of contract enforcement is given by the probability of bearing the resulting 
costs of non-compliance. They found that low levels of legal enforcement tend to crowd in 
trustworthiness: The first movers must take careful decisions on whom to enter a contract with as 
they cannot rely on the legal system. As a consequence, the second mover is motivated to behave 
in a trustworthy way. In contrast, when contracts are near-perfectly enforced, there is no 
observable crowding effect taking place as first movers enter the contracts because they know 
that the second movers are deterred from breaching. Personal trust is replaced by institutional 
                                                 
8 The incentive mechanism used in this experiment is based on fines. Zanella suggests, however, that other 
mechanisms may prove to be crowding-neutral or even crowd in motivation (1998, p. 44). This is in line with the 
psychological theories that incentives are only detrimental to intrinsic motivation when they are perceived to be 
controlling. 
trust. With intermediate levels of law enforcement, however, trust is crowded out as the first 
movers can neither rely on the second movers’ reciprocal behavior nor on the legal system, 
resulting in a non-monotonic relation between trust and the degree of contract enforcement. This 
evolutionary trust game was subjected to laboratory experiments. The results are consistent with 
crowding theory. 
 
3.3. Field evidence : Econometric studies 
3.3.1 Labor supply 
Crowding-out theory for the case of work motivation has been subject to econometric studies. 
Barkema (1995) looks at firms where the intensity of the personal relationship between the 
principals and the agents depends on the form of supervision. For the case of managers as agents 
of a certain firm one can distinguish three major types:  
(i) The managers are controlled by the parent company. This corresponds to a rather impersonal 
relationship, so that following our above proposition, a positive influence of monitoring on 
managers' performance is expected, because intrinsic motivation is little or not affected at all.  
(ii) The managers are controlled by their firm's chief executive officer which represents a 
personalized relationship. According to our proposition, monitoring in this case tends to reduce 
the agents' effort, as an external intervention shifts the locus of control towards external 
preferences, and the agents perceive that their competence is not acknowledged by their superior.  
(iii) The managers' behaviour is regulated by the board of directors. The crowding out effect is, 
according to our hypothesis, expected to be greater than in case (i) but smaller than in case (ii).  
Barkema's data set refers to 116 managers in medium-sized Dutch firms in 1985. They range 
from between less than one hundred to more than 30,000 employees and cover a wide variety of 
industries. The managers' individual effort is in line with Holmström and Milgrom (1990) 
operationalized as the number of hours invested. The intensity of regulating is captured by three 
aspects: the regularity with which their performance is evaluated; the degree of formality of the 
evaluation procedure; and the degree to which the managers are evaluated by well defined 
criteria. A measurement model is used to empirically establish that these variables meaningfully 
represent the latent variable 'regulating'. A structural model is then used to show the influence of 
so-defined external intervention on managers' performance. 
The results are consistent with the proposition advanced. The econometrically estimated 
parameters capturing the effect of external intervention on work performance turns out to be 
positive and statistically significant in case (i) of impersonal control. In case (ii) of personalized 
control, on the other hand, the corresponding parameter is statistically significant and negative; 
regulating strongly crowds out intrinsic motivation, so that the net effect of control on 
performance is counterproductive. In the intermediate case (iii) of somewhat personalized 
control, the estimated parameter does not deviate from zero in a statistically significant way. 
A second econometric study (Frey and Goette 1999) looks at the voluntary sector which is of 
substantial size in developed economies (see the survey by Rose-Ackerman  1996, Salamon and 
Anheier 1997). Intrinsic motivation has been argued to be important for volunteering (Freeman, 
1997). 
The authors use a unique data set from Switzerland to evaluate how financial rewards to 
volunteers affect their intrinsic motivation. The incidence of rewards is found to reduce 
volunteering. While the size of the rewards induces individuals to provide more volunteer work, 
the mere fact that they receive a payment significantly reduces their work efforts by 
approximately four hours. The magnitude of these effects is considerable. Evaluated at the 
median reward paid, volunteers work indeed less, suggesting that the crowding-out effect 
dominates the relative price effect. These results are immune to possible simultaneity bias or 
differences in reward policies between types of organizations. These findings have important 




Daycare centers are confronted with the problem that parents sometimes arrive late to pick up 
their children which forces teachers to stay after the official closing time. A typical economic 
approach (in line with the economic theory of crime, initiated by Becker, 1968) would suggest to 
introduce a fine for collecting children late. Such a punishment is expected to induce parents to 
reduce the occurrence of belatedly picking up their children. The effect of such a policy was 
studied by Gneezy and Rustichini (1999) for a daycare center in Israel. They first recorded the 
number of late-coming parents over a particular period of time. In a second period extending over 
twelve weeks, a significant monetary fine for collecting children late was introduced. After an 
initial learning phase, the number of late-coming parents increased substantially, which is 
consistent with the crowding-out effect. The introduction of a monetary fine transformed the 
relationship between parents and teachers from a non-monetary into a monetary one. As a result, 
the parents intrinsic motivation to keep to the time schedules was reduced or was crowded out 
altogether; the feeling now was that the teachers are “paid” for the disamenity of having to stay 
longer. That parents intrinsic motivation was crowded out for good by the introduction of a 
penalty system is supported by the fact that the number of late-coming parents remained stable at 
the level prevailing even after the fine was cancelled in a third phase. 
In a study not based on econometric techniques, but rather on the comparison of carefully 
conducted case studies, Austin and Gittell (1999) find a crowding effect with respect to 
performance measurement in the airline industry. The specific issue they studied is how airline 
carriers deal with delays and the responsible factors or persons. They found that attributing a 
single delay as exactly as possible to its source (as suggested by the principal agent theory), is 
negatively correlated with the achieved end, namely the airline’s on-time flight performance. The 
most successful company was the one that used the general term ‘team delay’ to indicate the 
source of a delay caused by the personnel. It thereby crowded in the intrinsic motivation to help 
out other units and groups instead of provoking disagreements, finger-pointing and cover-up 
activities. 
 
3.3.3. Siting Problems 
An econometric test of crowding theory refers to the important real life issue of finding a site for 
locally unwanted projects (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). This is known as the 'Not in my 
backyard' or NIMBY-problem. For many different projects and major capital investments, a wide 
consensus exists that they are worth being undertaken.  But no community is prepared to tolerate 
their vicinity.  Such 'nimbyistic' behavior is well documented in cases where communities object 
to the siting of e. g. hazardous waste disposal facilities or the construction of freeways.  
Economists have a handy tool to deal with such a situation.  As the aggregate net benefits of 
undertaking the project are positive, one must simply redistribute them in an appropriate way.  
The communities which are prepared to accept the undesired project within their borders must be 
compensated in such a way as to make their net benefits positive ( O′Hare 1977; Kunreuther and 
Kleindorfer 1986). This policy recommendation underestimates the true costs of price incentives 
in that it fails to take into account the detrimental effects of motivation crowding-out. 
The hypothesis that external incentives crowd out civic duty or intrinsic motivation and therefore 
the willingness to accept the locally undesired project was tested by analyzing the reaction to 
monetary compensation offered for a nuclear waste repository. A survey was undertaken among 
the population of the region concerned in Spring 1993. All respondents were asked if they were 
willing to permit the construction of a nuclear waste repository on the grounds of their 
community.  
More than half of the respondents (50.8%) agreed to have the nuclear waste repository built in 
their community, 44.9% opposed the siting, and 4.3% did not care where the facility was built.  
Thus, this unfavourable siting decision is widely accepted in spite of the fact that a nuclear waste 
repository is mostly seen as a heavy burden for the residents of the host community. In a next 
step the level of external compensation was varied.  To this end the respondents were asked the 
same questions whether they were willing to accept the construction of a nuclear waste 
repository.  This time, however, it was added that the Swiss parliament had decided to 
compensate all residents of the host community.  The amount offered was varied from CHF 2500 
per individual and year (N=117), to CHF 5000 (N=102), and CHF 7500 (N=86)9.  While 50.8% 
of the respondents agreed to accept the nuclear waste repository without compensation, the level 
of acceptance dropped to 24.6% when compensation was offered. The amount of compensation 
has no significant effect on the level of acceptance. About one quarter of the respondents seem to 
reject the facility simply because financial compensation is attached to it.  
Compensation fundamentally alters the perceived nature of a siting procedure.  What was 
observed in the analysis of verbal behavior represents precisely the type of mechanism postulated 
by motivation crowding theory.  While external intervention, i.e. offering compensation, manages 
to address concerns regarding the costs of a noxious facility, it reduces the intrinsic motivation to 
permit the construction of such a facility.  In the case studied, this latter effect even outweighs the 
benefits of external intervention, thereby reducing overall acceptance.  
                                                 
9 The compensation offered here is quite substantial. Median household income for our respondents is CHF 5250 per 
month. 
In a recent paper focusing on a related issue, Oberholzer and Kunreuther (1999) analyze the 
phenomenon of social pressure in local politics. They studied the case of a siting project for a 
radioactive waste repository in Pennsylvania, U.S.A. The developer offered a benefit package 
including job creation and monetary rewards and real estate price guarantees. Townships were 
expected to volunteer (which they did not, most probably due to peer pressure effects within the 
communities). The authors modeled the influence of social pressure on political decisions, i. e. 
they included the effects of belonging to one particular camp (with the possibility to reward or 
punish fellow members or outsiders, respectively) into the individual utility function. To test their 
model, they conducted an empirical analysis based on a survey of 509 township supervisors. 
They were asked what they believe to be the percentage of people endorsing the repository 
project in their township as well as how they would vote themselves in a referendum on the issue. 
To control for effects of the net size of the compensation package they also included questions on 
how the respondents would react to the offer of triple cash payments. Once Oberholzer and 
Kunreuther control for the assumed increase in public support the supervisors associate with 
higher benefits (and therefore a lower degree of social pressure), the effect of higher monetary 
incentives becomes significantly negative: A triple cash offer decreases the supervisors’ 
willingness to support the project by 11 percentage points, ceteris paribus. This result is again 
consistent with the crowding-out effect. 
 
3.3.4. Constitutional Design and Tax Evasion 
Crowding theory can be applied to how constitutional and other legal rules affect the individual 
citizens. Civic virtue (a particular manifestation of intrinsic motivation) is bolstered if the public 
laws convey the notion that citizens are trusted. Such trust is reflected in extensive rights and 
participation possibilities. Citizens are given the freedom to act on their own with respect to 
economic affairs, the freedom to freely express themselves and to demonstrate and strike if they 
feel dissatisfied with particular government decisions, and most importantly to take important 
political decisions by themselves via referenda and initiatives. The basic notion enshrined in the 
constitution that citizens are on average, and in general, reasonable human beings thus generates 
a crowding-in effect of civic virtue. In contrast, a constitution which implies a fundamental 
distrust of its citizens and seeks to discipline them tends to crowd out civic virtue and undermines 
the support which citizens are prepared to exert towards the basic law. The effects of such a 
distrustful constitution show up in various ways. The citizens are dissatisfied with the political 
system and respond by breaking the constitution and its laws whenever they expect to be able to 
do so at low cost. 
 An important reaction to distrustful public laws is a reduction of tax morale and as a 
consequence the evasion of taxes. It has been well established that tax paying behaviour cannot 
be explained in a satisfactory way without taking into account tax morale. Thus, based on the 
American Internal Revenue Service's Taxpayer Compliance Maintenance Program, Graetz and 
Wilde (1985: 358) conclude that 'the high compliance rate can only be explained either by 
taxpayers' (...) commitment to the responsibilities of citizenship and respect for the law or lack of 
opportunity for tax evasion'. The same authors (with Reinganum 1986) attribute the observed 
falling tax compliance in the United States to the erosion of tax ethics.10 
The extent of tax morale revealed by tax paying behaviour may be shown to depend on the type 
of constitution existing (see more fully, Pommerehne and Frey 1993; Pommerehne and Weck-
Hannemann 1996; Frey 1997b). Switzerland presents a suitable test case because the various 
cantons have different degrees of political participation possibilities. It is hypothesized that the 
more extended political participation possibilities in the form of citizens' meetings, obligatory 
and optional referenda and initiatives are, and the broader the respective competencies are, the 
higher is tax morale and (ceteris paribus) tax compliance. On the basis of these characteristics, 
about one third of the 26 Swiss cantons are classified as pure direct democracy, another third as 
pure representative democracies, and the rest satisfies only some of the characteristics. A cross 
section / time series (for the years 1965, 1970, 1978, i.e. 78 observations) multiple regression 
explaining the part of income not declared yields the following results: The coefficients of the 
variables indicating the type of democracy - controlling for all the determinants normally used in 
such tax equations - have the theoretically expected signs. In cantons with a high degree of direct 
political control, tax morale is (cet. par.) higher. The part of income concealed falls short of the 
mean of all cantons by 7.7 percentage points, or in absolute terms the average amount of income 
concealed is about SFr. 1,600 (per taxpayer) less than the mean income concealed in all cantons. 
In contrast, in cantons with a low degree of political control, tax morale is (cet. par.) lower. The 
                                                 
10 Further evidence can be found, among others, in Schwartz and Orleans (1967), Lewis (1982), Roth, Scholz and 
Witte (1989), Pyle (1990), and Slemrod (1992). 
part of concealed income is four percentage points higher than the average income gap, and the 
mean income undeclared exceeds the mean of all cantons by about SFr. 1,500. The estimation 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that greater democratic participation possibilities 
crowds in intrinsic motivation in the form of civic virtue. 
Another test of the crowding-out effect of public laws and institutions looks at wages in the 
government sector. The fact that government employees in many countries are prepared to work 
for a significantly lower salary (for evidence see e.g. Poterba and Rueben 1994) may be 
attributed to the higher motivation of the selection of people seeking employment in the public 
sector.11 An example would be those teachers who want to work in government schools because 
they believe in the virtue of public education for society. The increasing tendency to closely 
supervise government employees and to curtail their discretionary room has crowded out their 
work morale which is consistent with a continuous reduction of private sector wage premiums. 
A third way to test the influence of government rules on civic virtues looks at the cost of 
financing public expenditures in terms of interest rates for government bonds. It has been argued 
(Schultz and Weingast 1994) that democracies find it less costly to finance themselves than 
authoritarian political systems because nations under a democratic constitution are more credible, 
and therefore more likely to pay back their debts. The observation of lower cost of finance under 
a democratic constitution is, however, also fully consistent with crowding theory: the citizens 
have a higher level of trust in, and attachment to, their state and are therefore more willing to 
grant credit to their state at more favourable financial conditions than are the subjects oppressed 
by a constitution. 
On a more general level, there is a cumulative body of research indicating that people's 
perceptions of how they are treated by the authorities strongly affect their evaluation of 
authorities and laws, and their willingness to cooperate with them (e.g. Bardach and Kagan 1982, 
Lind and Tyler 1988, Tyler and McGraw 1986). Citizens who consider the constitution and its 
laws, and the authorities acting on their basis to be fair and to treat them respectfully, tend to be 
more compliant than those with more negative perceptions of government (e.g., Thibault and 
Walker, 1976, and for extensive empirical evidence see Tyler, 1990, 1997). In an econometric 
                                                 
11 Alternative explanations for the unobserved factor producing the wage differential such as higher fringe benefits 
or lower work intensity are, of course, possible. 
study, Kucher and Götte (1998) find evidence for a relation between a high ratio of concurrence 
of a city government’s suggestions on how to vote with the actual results at the ballot and lower 
tax evasion. Kelman (1992) furthermore shows that the extensive use of adversary institutions for 
resolving public conflicts (which are prevalent, e.g., in the United States) tends to crowd out 
civic virtue.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Many scholars have accepted the theoretical possibility of crowding effects, i. e. that an external 
intervention via monetary incentives or punishments may undermine (and under different 
indentifiable conditions strengthen) intrinsic motivation. But many of them have been critical 
about the empirical relevance of the crowding effects.  
This survey shows that this scepticism is unwarranted and that there exists indeed compelling 
empirical evidence for the existence of crowding out and crowding in. This conclusion is based 
on circumstantial evidence, laboratory evidence by both psychologists and economists as well as 
field evidence by econometric studies. The evidence refers to a wide variety of areas of the 
economy and society: children’s learning behavior; patients’ readiness to take prescribed 
medication; monetary and symbolic rewards for undertaking various laboratory tasks; the 
tendency to reciprocate in the laboratory setting reflecting work conditions in a firm; the amount 
of trust exhibited in a laboratory situation of incomplete contracts; the reaction of managers to 
various forms of supervision by their superiors; the preparedness to offer voluntary work; the 
observation of time schedules in daycare centers; the on-time flight performance in the airline 
industry; the readiness to accept nuclear waste repositories (and other locally unwanted sites); 
and the amount of civic virtue exhibited, in particular with respect to fulfilling one’s tax 
obligations (tax morale). This empirical evidence has been collected for many different countries 
and periods. 
Crowding effects thus are an empirically relevant phenomenon. But it does, of course, not always 
prevail over the traditional relative price effect. Indeed, an effort has been made both in theory 
and in the empirical applications to identify the conditions under which crowding-out and 
crowding-in effects arise, and under which they are predicted to dominate the relative price 
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